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Cognitive theories of emotional disorders predict that individuals suffering from an emotional 
disorder exhibit increased interference for stimuli that are idiosyncratic to their disorder 
(Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). However, due to inconsistent results, there is debate as 
to whether attention disrupting effects for negative information occur in depression. Suitability 
of experimental stimuli employed to elicit attentional biases is a commonly cited limitation that 
may have contributed to these inconsistencies. The present investigation was designed to 
examine the influence of rumination on the operation of attentional biases in depression using a 
digit-parity task. Depressed and never-depressed participants were required to make a speeded 
judgement about the parity of two digits flanking a to-be-ignored centrally presented word. 
Depressed individuals displayed longer digit-parity response times for depression-relevant words 
relative to never-depressed individuals. Furthermore, depressed individuals displayed the longest 
digit-parity response times for word stimuli relevant to the idiosyncratic content of their 
ruminative thoughts. These findings highlight the importance of studying the idiosyncratic 
content of each depressed individuals ruminative themes when investigating attentional biases 













 Firstly, I would like to thank my team, Dr. Mike Dixon, Dr. Christine Purdon, and Dr. 
Elizabeth Nilsen. Collectively, their generosity and support have been invaluable throughout all 
stages of this project. On a personal level, I would like to thank Dr. Dixon for his guidance and 
expertise during the past two years, Dr. Purdon for giving me a soft place to land, and Dr. Nilsen 
for her insight and helpful comments.  




















  This Master‟s Thesis is dedicated to all the people who helped bring me to where I am 
today. To my parents who didn‟t laugh when at the age of 26, I told them I was going to abandon 
my career and embark on a 6 year journey to realize a dream. To my sister who not only inspires 
me but continues to represent what I one day aspire to be. I am eternally grateful for your 
steadfast commitment to my well-being, and unrelenting belief in my ability to succeed in 
whatever endeavour I pursue. 
 To anyone who has ever felt the darkness of depression - it is only when we attempt to 
see the world through your eyes, do we begin to understand your plight. This project is my 





Table of Contents 
List of Tables……………………….……….………………………………………..….………vii 










Discussion………………………………………………………………………………………..25   
References………………………………………………………………………………….…….31 
Appendices………………………………………………………………………………….……36 
 Appendix A: Diagnostic Interview………………………………………………….…...36 










List of Tables 
 
Table 1. Demographic and clinical characteristics of the two participant groups. Means and 
(standard deviations) of variables by diagnostic group…………………………………….20 
Table 2. Untrimmed mean digit-parity response times (ms) for each word category as a function 
of diagnosis………………………………………………………………………………….22 




















List of Figures 
Figure 1A. Untrimmed mean digit-parity reaction times for each word type as a function of 
diagnostic group. Error bars represent confidence intervals for each mean……………….23 
Figure 1B. Trimmed mean digit-parity reaction times for each word type as a function of 





















 Of all mental illnesses, clinical depression is one of the single most common, affecting 
16.2% of American adults over the age of 18 across the lifespan (Kessler et al., 2003). 
Depression is not only common but recurrent, with over 85% of depressed patients experiencing 
a repeat episode within 15 years after their first episode (Mueller et al., 1999). Given this high 
rate of recurrence, it has been reasoned that a stable vulnerability, or vulnerabilities exist which 
confer greater risk for experiencing a relapse. 
 For over two decades, a substantial effort has been made to identify such vulnerability 
factors. Much of this research has been guided by cognitive theories, which implicate biased 
information processing as a risk factor for experiencing depressive episodes. In studies of 
attention and memory, the “emotion-congruent hypothesis” predicts that individuals suffering 
from an emotional disorder are better able to learn and remember material that is consistent with 
their disorder (for a review see Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). To this end, depressed 
individuals are said to pay greater attention to, and show greater recall for negative, depression-
relevant information than either positive or neutral information. To-date research attempting to 
demonstrate the presence of depression-relevant attentional biases has yielded inconsistent 
findings. Indeed, while several authors have documented depression-relevant attentional biases 
in clinical populations (e.g., Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Gotlib & Cane, 1987; Gotlib, 
Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004), many others have not (e.g., Mogg, Bradley, Williams, 
& Mathews, 1993; McCabe, Gotlib & Martin, 2000; Yovel & Mineka, 2005).  
Such inconsistencies led Mathews and MacLeod (1994) to conclude that anxiety 
disorders – but not depression- are characterized by selective attention favouring threatening 




explicit memory favouring negative self-relevant information. However, in a more recent review 
of research on cognitive processing and emotional disorders, Mathews and Macleod (2005) 
concluded that research now suggests exceptions to their earlier general claim. Indeed, closer 
examination of this literature confirms the presence of attentional biases in depression, but 
results are dependent on the nature of the task employed to assess them and the nature of the 
depression-relevant stimuli used (i.e., whether the stimuli are negative in general or specifically 
related to patients‟ idiosyncratic depressive symptoms).  
One of the most common methods used to examine attentional bias is the emotional 
Stroop colour-naming task. The emotional Stroop task is an interference task in which 
participants attend to one aspect of a compound stimulus and attempt to ignore another aspect of 
the stimulus. Specifically, participants are asked to name the colour in which a word is presented 
while attempting to ignore the emotional content of the word itself. In this task an inability to 
ignore the emotional content of the words will interfere with the participants‟ ability to name the 
colour of the words. It is reasoned that the emotional content of the word momentarily captures 
attention, resulting in slower colour naming times for emotional words as compared to neutral, or 
non-emotional, words (Wentura, Rothemund, & Bak, 2000). Response-time differences between 
emotional and neutral words have typically been found. However, the actual mechanism by 
which the emotional content affects performance is a matter of debate. For example, it has been 
suggested that the emotional Stroop effect is merely an artifact of improper matching of the 
linguistic characteristics of emotional and neutral words, and that the effects observed have little 
to do with the emotion status of the items. 
Larsen, Mercer, and Balota (2006) demonstrated the importance of matching emotional 




length, orthographic neighbourhood size) of 1,033 words used in 32 published emotional Stroop 
studies, finding that overall, the emotional words occurred less frequently in written text, 
contained more letters, and came from smaller orthographic neighbourhoods than words used as 
controls. This combination of linguistic characteristics could account for the slowing of colour 
naming times for emotional words compared to control words. Indeed, when authors controlled 
for lexical differences among the word categories, speed differences between the emotion words 
and control word categories disappeared.  Furthermore, researchers have argued that attentional 
capture by emotional stimuli (relative to neutral stimuli) may not be the result of the emotionality 
of the stimuli per se but rather because the emotional words form a salient category, unlike their 
random-themed counterparts. Consequently, in the context of completing a cognitive task, 
participants notice that a particular percentage of the words they encounter belong to a specific 
category (resulting in longer response times on trials containing those stimuli) whereas other 
words are seemingly drawn from random categories (McKenna & Sharma, 1995).   
An alternative tool for studying attentional bias is the dot-probe task. This task is 
purported to yield a more direct measure of the influence of emotional words on attention. In this 
task, two words are briefly presented on a computer screen (one just above the center of the 
screen and one just below). Participants are instructed to read the top word aloud. On some trials, 
when the words disappear a dot appears in the same location as one of the words. Participants are 
instructed to make a button-press response as quickly as they can as soon as they see the dot. 
Participants‟ responses to the probes are timed and used to infer where the person's attention was 
focused. The dot-probe task is predicated on assumptions concerning spatial attention; when we 
shift our attention to specific locations in space, objects within that location will be more 




attention, then probes presented in that location will be responded to more efficiently than probes 
presented in the other location. To study the influence of emotion on attention using a dot-probe 
paradigm, one of the presented words is neutral, and the other is an emotional word.  It is 
assumed that if attentional biases exist for certain words in people with mood and anxiety 
problems, they will respond faster when the dot appears in the same spatial location as the 
emotional word. Indeed, anxious individuals respond faster to dots that are in the same location 
as a threatening stimulus, than in the other location.  These response time effects have been 
interpreted as a form of hyper-vigilance for threat (for a review, see Mogg & Bradley, 1998).  
Like the emotional Stroop task, the dot-probe task is not immune from controversy. 
Derryberry and Reed (2002) point out that faster response times for probes appearing at the 
threat word location may also arise as a result of a difficulty disengaging from threatening 
material rather than a hyper-vigilance for threat. Furthermore, although at first glance, the dot-
probe task seems like a simple detection task, a breakdown of this task‟s components reveals 
layers of complexity. First participants are asked to read the top word of each word pair aloud as 
soon as it appears. Thus attention is allocated preferentially to the topmost display location, and 
indeed all participants, regardless of clinical diagnosis, show faster dot-detection for top 
locations. Participants are then asked to shift attention from word reading in one location to dot 
detection in either the same location or a different location.  Thus in terms of attention, the task 
contains a salient location (the top word), a switch of attention (from word reading to dot 
detection), as well as the attention disrupting features of the emotional words.  It is unknown 
which aspects of this complex task are underlying the response time effects in depressed and 




An alternative to the dot probe task is Wolford and Morrison‟s (1980) digit-parity task. In 
this task, a fixation cross is presented in the center of a computer display. The fixation cross is 
then replaced by a centrally presented word flanked by two digits. Participants are instructed to 
ignore the center word and make a speeded judgement about whether the parity of the two digits 
match (i.e., both odd, or both even) or mismatch (i.e., one odd and the other even). Recently this 
task has proven to be a sensitive measure of the attention-disrupting effects of sexually-explicit 
word stimuli in an unselected population (Aquino & Arnell, 2007). Although to date this task has 
only been used on unselected individuals it is a good candidate for detecting attentional biases in 
those suffering from depression. 
When considering any type of cognitive task designed to study attentional biases in 
clinical populations care must be taken to effect a close match between the concerns of the 
population being examined and the stimuli used within the cognitive task. For example, using a 
dot probe task, MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata (1986) found that clinically anxious but not 
clinically depressed participants were faster to detect probes in threatening word locations 
compared to affectively neutral word locations. This study is commonly cited as evidence for the 
existence of anxiety-relevant attentional biases and the absence of an equivalent depression-
relevant attentional bias. However, it could be argued that the null effects of the depressed group 
are not surprising given that the words used (i.e., threat-related) did not properly reflect their 
concerns.  
 Using a similar study design, Mathews, Ridgeway, and Williamson (1996) found that 
response times of depressed, but not anxious participants, were influenced by socially-
threatening words (e.g., lonely, stupid). They concluded that these results provided evidence for 




acknowledged that their findings could be interpreted as evidence for the existence of 
rumination-relevant attentional biases in depression; “if depressed subjects ruminate a great deal 
about their own personal inadequacy, then they may attend to related words because they match 
these ruminations, rather than because they are perceived as threatening in the sense of 
representing a dangerous event” (p.704). It seems then when assessing the match between the 
words used in cognitive paradigms and depressed participants‟ concerns, an important concept to 
consider is rumination. Although these authors and others have speculated about a possible link 
between attention and rumination, there is a paucity of research applying the experimental 
paradigms used to study attention to the topic of rumination.  Indeed, given the importance of 
matching the words used in cognitive paradigms to the direct concerns of the clinical populations 
being studied, the content of participants‟ rumination and the extent to which this is reflected in 
the stimuli used to study attention, may be a key factor in finding evidence for attentional biases 
in depression.  
 In the past 15 years, persistent, recyclic, negative thinking, in the form of rumination, has 
attracted increasing theoretical and empirical interest. From a clinical perspective, many 
depressed patients report experiencing rumination, describing a repetitive reconsideration and 
intrusive recollection of negative thoughts. Although the experience of depressed mood is 
understandably unpleasant, depressed individuals who report experiencing repetitive intrusive 
recollections of negative thoughts may find it difficult to concentrate on everyday tasks. For 
example, a dysphoric student may report having his concentration derailed during a lecture by 
thoughts about what is wrong with him and why he is feeling so down. From an empirical 
perspective, the recognition of rumination as a key cognitive feature of depression has led to an 




development, maintenance, and recurrence of depression (Teasdale, 1988; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991).  
Several theorists have argued that depression is maintained through a vicious cycle 
between depressed mood and negativistic ruminative thinking. According to Teasdale‟s (1988) 
differential activation theory, once an individual is initially depressed, an important factor that 
determines whether their depression remains mild or becomes more severe and persistent is the 
nature of the negative cognitive processes and constructs that become active and accessible in the 
depressed state. Depression is maintained when depressed mood leads to negative attributions 
and self-evaluations, which in turn contribute to more depressed mood, and so on.     
Within the response styles theory of depression, Nolen-Hoeksema and colleagues have 
been influential in advancing our knowledge of ruminative thinking in depression. Here, 
rumination is defined as “behaviours and thoughts that focus one‟s attention on one‟s depressive 
symptoms and on the implications of these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569). 
Accordingly, ruminative responses to depression are symptom focused and contemplative.  
This repetitive style of negative thinking in response to depressed mood has been 
associated with a number of deleterious outcomes. Empirically supported research and field 
studies have shown that ruminative responses to depression prolong and intensify depressed 
mood (e.g., for review, see Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). For example, using a prospective 
longitudinal study design, Just and Alloy (1997) found that initially nondepressed individuals 
who reported ruminating in response to depressed mood were more likely to experience a major 
depressive episode over eighteen months than were individuals who reported distracting 
themselves from their symptoms. Additionally, using a large scale longitudinal community-based 




had a ruminative style at the initial assessment had relatively more severe and longer lasting 
depressive symptoms one year later after accounting for initial levels of depressive symptoms.  
Furthermore, when individuals ruminate in the context of dysphoric mood, they recall more 
negative memories from the past, interpret their current situation more negatively, and are more 
pessimistic about their future (Lyubomisky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 1995).  
 In a study designed to explore the phenomenology of dysphoric rumination, 
Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, and Berg (1999), found that compared to dysphoric non-
ruminators and non-dysphoric ruminators, the ruminative thoughts of dysphoric ruminators 
tended to be more negative, self-critical, and self-blaming (e.g., thinking “I‟m lazy” or “I‟m 
unpopular”). In addition, depressed individuals paid significantly more attention to their 
ruminative thoughts and they rated them as being more intrusive in comparison to non-clinical 
samples (Papegeorgiou & Wells, 1999). This finding supports previous assertions that 
rumination may function to draw one‟s attention to one‟s depressive symptoms, activating a 
network of negative biased thoughts (Fennel & Teasdale, 1984).  
Only in the last decade have empirical attempts been made to link information processing 
disruptions to rumination. Confirmatory evidence has emerged highlighting the association 
between rumination and excessive elaboration on negative information, as indexed by pupil 
dilation (Siegle, Steinhauer, Carter & Thase, 2003). Our pupils will constrict and retract to a 
variety of external stimuli even in an environment with constant lighting.  In general, negatively 
valenced stimuli will lead to a sustained state of dilation (as opposed to an alteration of 
constriction and dilation). Notably, sustained pupil dilation in depressed individuals was 
particularly apparent for negative and personally relevant information involving words and 




More recently, Donaldson, Lam, and Mathews (2007) investigated the role of rumination 
on attention using a cognitive paradigm. Depressed and control participants were randomly 
assigned to either a rumination or distraction condition. The individuals assigned to the 
rumination condition were instructed to focus their attention inward using a series of statements 
aimed at promoting thoughts related to emotion, behaviours and the self. Those assigned to the 
distraction condition were instructed to focus their attention externally, away from thoughts 
related to emotion, behaviours and the self. Participants then participated in a dot-probe task. 
Results revealed that the depressed, but not the control, participants were faster to detect probes 
in the location of negative words compared to dots in positive, or affectively neutral word 
locations. Furthermore, trait rumination predicted attentional bias scores (the difference between 
response times for probes in negative word locations versus neutral word locations). That is, 
depressed individuals who showed high levels of habitual rumination had higher attentional bias 
scores, leading study investigators to conclude that depression is associated with an attentional 
bias for negative information and that this bias is stronger in individuals who ruminate.      
 Thus, the maladaptive impact of rumination as a style of thinking on the course and 
maintenance of depression is well established in the literature. Furthermore, recent attempts have 
been made to link ruminative style to the existence of attentional biases in depression. However, 
much remains unclear regarding the possible influence of rumination content on attentional 
biases within depression. More specifically, given that depressed persons may ruminate about 
certain concepts but not others, it is important to use stimuli that reflect the idiosyncratic content 







 The goal of the present study was to use a cognitive paradigm to demonstrate that 
depressed individuals who ruminate display attentional biases for stimuli relevant to content of 
the themes on which they ruminate. The logic behind the current investigation is based on three 
premises. First, rumination is an important cognitive feature of depression. Second, when 
ruminating, depressed individuals are focusing on their emotional state (i.e., depressive 
symptoms and the implication of these symptoms). Third, the stimuli employed for the purposes 
of detecting attentional biases in depression should reflect the ruminative-content of the 
particular individual.  
Based on these considerations, the present investigation examines the role of rumination-
content on the presence of attentional biases in persons diagnosed with Major Depressive 
Disorder (MDD) using Wolford and Morrison‟s (1980) digit-parity task.  
At a global level, we first examined whether depression-relevant words would disrupt 
attention and limit participant‟s ability to perform a simple digit-parity task. We predicted that 
depression-relevant words will influence parity judgments only in individuals who are clinically 
depressed.  In order to conclude that the depression relevance of the words was responsible for 
disrupting performance a number of control sets of words matched in word length and frequency 
to the depression-relevant word category were employed (as per Larsen et al., 2006). The first set 
of control words consisted of random neutral words. A second set of control words were drawn 
from a highly salient, but non-emotional, category – musical instruments, in order to control for 
category saliency (as per McKenna & Sharma, 1995). Since musical instruments form a salient 
category (as salient, if not more so – than depression-relevant words), if it is category 




these effects should emerge for both depression-relevant and musical instrument names. If only 
depression-relevant words have an influence on parity judgement response times, we can rule out 
that this effect is due to the fact that these words come from a salient category. Since our interest 
was in depression relevance as opposed to the emotional content of words per se, we chose as a 
final control set, adjectives that conveyed emotion, but were not relevant to depression (e.g., 
calm, agreeable, gentle). Thus if attention was disrupted by words that convey emotion (and not 
just by depression-relevant words as we predicted) then these words should also influence parity 
judgements. Therefore, all four word categories (depression-relevant words, neutral control 
words, musical instrument control words and emotional adjective control words) were presented 
randomly within a block of trials.  
Although at a global level we were interested in attentional biases for depression-relevant 
words, we were primarily interested in the influence of stimuli relevant to participant's specific 
ruminative content on attention. We speculated that although depression-relevant words might 
disrupt performance in a digit-parity task to some degree, words relevant to a specific depressed 
individuals‟ ruminative-content would disrupt performance considerably more. In order to test 
this hypothesis a rumination-relevant word category was created for each depressed participant 
using data from the Rumination-Relevant Rating Scale (RRRS) (this procedure is described in 
detail later).  Thus, for depressed participants depression relevant words were parsed into 
rumination relevant, and depression relevant words (the latter category involving depression 
relevent words that were NOT the focus of their ruminative thoughts). 
Thus, there were two main hypotheses: 
First, depressed individuals would show an attentional bias for depression-relevant 




which the depression-relevant words are presented between the digits, relative to trials in which 
words from any of the control word categories are presented.  By contrast, digit-parity RTs for 
the never-depressed individuals would be similar across all word categories (i.e., digit-parity RTs 
for the depression-relevant words will parallel RTs for all three control word categories).   
The second, central prediction was that depressed individuals would show the longest 
response times for words that specifically matched the content of their rumination (i.e., 
rumination-relevant words would be associated with even longer parity judgement times than 






Participants were recruited from a sample of approximately 1500 University of Waterloo 
undergraduate psychology students who received course credit for their completion of a mass 
testing screening session at the beginning of the academic term. Those whose Beck Depression 
Inventory, second edition (BDI-II) scores were less than 6 at the time of the screening were 
identified as “likely never depressed controls,” and those whose BDI-II scores were greater than 
18 were identified as “likely depressed.” 
 Of that sample forty-five participants, identified as belonging to one of the 
aforementioned potential categories, were recruited to participate in the study for additional 
course credit. Upon completion of study procedures, all participants completed the Mood 
Disorders module of the Structured Diagnostic Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID; 
First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1997) to confirm diagnostic status. In addition to the SCID 
interview, participants were screened for additional diagnoses including schizophrenia, panic 
disorder, specific phobia, generalized anxiety disorder, anorexia nervosa, and bulimia nervosa 
using procedures developed by Othmer & Othmer (1989).  
 The depressed group consisted of a total of 6 (5 male, 1 female) University of Waterloo 
undergraduate students ranging in age from 18 to 24 (M = 20.2 years) who met criteria for 
current Major Depressive Disorder on the SCID. Participants in the depressed group were 
required to have a primary diagnosis of major depression and currently be in a depressive 
episode. Participants were also required to be without current or past organic, psychotic, or 
manic features, and free from a co-morbid anxiety disorder. The never depressed control group 




age from 16 to 24 (M = 19.2 years). Participants were required to have no current or past history 
of emotional disorder (including anxiety disorders). Lastly, all study participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, were right –handed, and had learned English by the age of eight. 
Stimuli and Apparatus  
 There were four categories of stimulus words: 25 depression-relevant words, 25 neutral 
control words, 25 musical instrument control words, and 25 emotional adjective control words. 
The depression-relevant words were selected from multiple studies in which valence norms from 
both clinical and non-clinical samples were reported (Bradley & Mathews, 1983; Mogg, Bradley, 
Williams, & Matthews, 1993). Each depression-relevant word was paired with a neutral word, a 
musical instrument word, and an emotional adjective word matched for length and frequency 
using the MRC Psycholinguist Database. Thus, each word in the depression-relevant category 
had a length-and-frequency-matched counterpart in each of the other three control categories. 
Word sets are shown in Appendix A.  
 Word stimuli were presented on a computer screen in black against a light grey 
background. Digits and words were presented in 16-point bold Courier New font and all words 
were capitalized. The words were 4 to 9 letters long and subtended approximately 1º in height 
and 2º to 5º in width. The digits were spaced 10.5 cm apart (11.5º) on all trials. Only the digits 2, 
3, 5, and 8 were used as parity stimuli. The digits were randomly paired with the constraint that 
on half of the trials the pair of digits had the same parity.   
 All participants were presented with two blocks of 100 digit-parity trials each, with 20 
practice trials prior to block 1. The practice block used neutral words that were different from the 




with the constraint that each word category be presented 5 times every 20 trials. In block 2 the 
same 100 words were again shown in random order with the same constraints.  
Digit-Parity Task 
Each parity trial began with the presentation of a black fixation cross in the center of the 
computer screen for 500ms, followed by a 500ms blank interval. The word and the digits that 
flanked the word were presented simultaneously. The word and digits remained on the screen 
until a parity judgement response was made. Participants were told to use their dominant hand to 
press the „M‟ key if the parity of the digits matched (were both odd, or were both even), and to 
press the „N‟ key if the parity of the digits mismatched (one odd and the other even). Participants 
were asked to respond as quickly as possible while being accurate and to ignore the centrally 
presented word. The experiment was controlled using E-Prime software (Schneider, Eschman, & 
Zuccolotto, 2002) running on an IBM-compatible desktop computer with a 17” colour monitor. 
Displays consisted of two digits flanking a word and were viewed from an unfixed distance of 
approximately 55 cm.  
Questionnaires 
Beck Depression Inventory – Second Edition (BDI-II). The BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & 
Brown, 1996) is a 21-item self-report questionnaire used to measure the severity of current 
depressive symptomatology, with documented adequate validity and reliability for both clinical 
and research purposes (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988). In order to complete the questionnaire, 
participants were asked to rate on a scale of 0 to 3 the degree to which they have experienced 
various symptoms of depression during the past two weeks (e.g., loss of pleasure, change in 
sleep patterns). Scores from all of the items were summed for a total score ranging from 0 to 63, 




Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ). The RSQ was used to measure individual 
differences in response to sadness or depressed mood by asking participants what they generally 
do when they feel depressed. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they 
engaged in each activity (e.g., “think about how alone you feel”) when depressed on a four-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). According to the scoring 
method outlined by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991), the RSQ has two scales: 21 items on 
the RSQ comprise the rumination scale (RRS) and 11 items comprise the distraction scale 
(RDS). Both subscales demonstrate adequate test-retest reliability (Just & Alloy, 1997), 
convergent validity (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993), and construct validity 
(Keuhner & Weber, 1999). 
Beck Anxiety Index (BAI). The BAI (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988) is a 21-item 
self-report questionnaire used to measure the severity of a range of physiological and cognitive 
symptoms of anxiety over the preceding week. Respondents indicate on a four-point Likert-like 
scale the degree to which each of the 21 symptoms have bothered them in the past week.  The 
scale ranged from 1 (not at all) to 4 (Severely, e.g., "I could barely stand it"). Items include 
“heart pounding or racing” and “nervous.” Furthermore, in terms of item overlap between 
depression and anxiety, the BAI and BDI appear to have the best discriminant validity (Clark & 
Watson, 1991). 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ). The PSWQ (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990) is a 16-item self-report questionnaire used to assess worry. Respondents 
indicated on a five-point Likert-like scale ranging from 1 (not at all typical) to 5 (very typical) 
the degree to which each of the 16 statements applied to them. Items include “My worries 




have good internal consistency and test-retest reliability in undergraduates (Meyer, Miller, 
Metzger & Borkovec, 1990).   
Rumination-Relevant Rating Scale (RRRS).  The RRRS is a 25-item self-report 
questionnaire designed by the study author as a gross measure of the amount of time participants 
spent ruminating about each of the depression-relevant word items found within the digit-parity 
task (see Appendix B). Participants were asked to rate how often they thought about a list of 
statements when feeling down, sad, or depressed on a four-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 
(never) to 4 (always). Statements contained each of the 25 depression-relevant words previously 
shown in the digit-parity task. Items include “How much of a failure I am,” “How unhappy I 
am,” and “How stupid I am.”  
Experimental Procedure 
 All participants were tested individually. Testing sessions ranged from 90 minutes to 120 
minutes depending on the length of the diagnostic interview. Although the experimenter was not 
blind to the hypotheses of the experiment, the experimenter was blind to the depression status of 
the participants as each participant completed a SCID-interview only after completing all of the 
experimental procedures. 
 At the beginning of the testing session, participants were asked to complete an 
information consent form. After consent was obtained, participants completed the digit-parity 
task. Following the digit-parity task, participants completed the BDI-II, BAI, PSWQ, RSQ, and 
rumination rating scale. Upon completion of the rumination rating scale, each participant 
completed a SCID-interview to determine their depression status. Finally, participants were 






 A rumination-relevant word category was created for each depressed participant using 
data from the Rumination-Relevant Rating Scale (RRRS), completed at the end of the testing 
procedure. Any depression-relevant item endorsed as a 4 (indicating “always” thinking about this 
item when feeling down, sad, depressed) on the RRRS was selected to comprise the rumination-
relevant word category for the individual. Thus, for each depressed participant the depression-
relevant word category was subdivided into rumination-relevant and non-rumination relevant 
word categories. Since depression relevant words were parsed into rumination and non-
rumination categories, so too were the control words. Recall that each depression-relevant word 
had a frequency-matched and length-matched counterpart in each of the three control word 
categories.  Thus, if a depressed participant reported ruminating about 10 words (as indicated by 
a 4 on the RRRS) they would have 10 rumination-relevant and 15 non-rumination depression-
relevant words. The control categories would similarly be parsed into 3 sets of 10 words 
(matched to the rumination words) and 3 sets of 15 words (matched to the non-rumination 
depression relevant words). In this way, the rumination-relevant and non-rumination depression-
relevant words would have three sets of frequency and length matched control words (neutral 
controls, musical instrument controls, emotional adjective controls.  Accordingly, each 
participant had eight word sets 1) rumination-relevant words (R) 2) control neutral words 
matched to R words (C1-R) 3) control musical instrument words matched to R words (C2-R) 4) 
control emotional adjective words matched to R words (C3-R) 5) non-rumination depression-
relevant words (NR) 6) control neutral words matched to NR words (C1-NR) 7) control musical 
instrument words matched to NR words (C2-NR) 8) control emotional adjective words matched 




Rumination, NR non-rumination, and C stands for control. Six never depressed control 






 Demographic and clinical characteristics for the depressed and never-depressed control 
participant groups are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Demographic and clinical characteristics of the two participant groups. Means and 
(standard deviations) of variables by diagnostic group. 
    
Diagnostic 
Group     
Variable  Depressed Never Depressed 
      
N        6  28  
Age  20.2 (1.8)  19.2 (1.9)  
BDI-II  25.7 (9.9)  12.6 (7.1)  
BAI  35.8 (11.3)  31.5 (5.9)  
PSWQ  47.7 (8.5)  41.4 (9.5)  
RRS  59.7 (16.7) 48.1 (8.9)  
RDS  24.0 (5.2)  22.5 (5.4)  
      
 
An independent samples t-test revealed no significant difference between the two groups 
in terms of age, t(32) = 1.13, p = 0.27.  
Participants‟ scores on the BDI-II, BAI, PSWQ, and RRS, completed after the digit-
parity task, are also presented in Table 1. Independent sample t-tests yielded significant 
differences among the two groups on the BDI-II, t(34) = 3.96, p <.01. As expected, the depressed 
participants showed higher scores on the BDI-II than did the control participants, indicating a 
greater level of depressive symptomatology. No other self-report measures yielded significant 




Frequency and word length 
  One-way ANOVA‟s were performed to examine whether word length or word frequency 
differed significantly across word categories (depression-relevant, neutral, musical instruments, 
and emotional adjectives). Both ANOVAs showed nonsignificant results, p‟s > 0.18, providing 
evidence for the equivalence of the word types in terms of word frequency and length.  
Digit-Parity Task 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 Only digit-parity response times (RTs) for correct responses were analyzed. Error rates 
were low (depressed: 0.06%, and control: 0.05%). An independent samples t-test comparing 
mean error rates for the depressed participants and the control participants, revealed no 
significant differences among the two groups, t(32)=.017, p = .99. Furthermore, a 2x2x4 mixed 
model analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on mean error rates with rumination 
category (rumination-relevant, non-rumination-relevant) and word (depression-relevant, neutral, 
music, emotional adjectives) as within-participant variables and group (depressed, non-
depressed) as a between-participant variable. The analysis did not reveal any significant results, 
all p‟s > .13. Thus any differences in the response times (reported below) were not attributable to 
speed-accuracy tradeoffs.    
In attention disrupting tasks such as the digit-parity task used here, the predicted effects 
are likely to be carried in the tail of the RT distribution. Hence liberal outlier trimming 
procedures would likely eliminate any effects. The response times were analyzed in two ways.  
First for each participant the RTs for each of the eight cells were averaged, and these raw means 
served as the input data for the analyses of variance and planned comparisons. Second a 




and the averages were recalculated. (To foreshadow the results, both analytical strategies yielded 
similar effects).  
Response Times Untrimmed 
 Mean digit-parity response times (ms) for each word category as a function of diagnosis 
are shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. Untrimmed digit-parity mean response times (ms) for each word category as a function 
of diagnosis. 
 
          
                    
    R     C1-R C2-R C3-R NR C1-NR C2-NR C3-NR 





































                    
 
Note. R stands for Rumination, NR for non-rumination, and C stands for control. Standard 
deviations are shown in brackets. 
 
 
A 2x2x4 mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on mean response times 
with rumination category (R, NR) and word category (depression-relevant, neutral, musical 
instrument, emotional adjective) as within-subjects variables and diagnosis (depressed, non-
depressed) as a between-subjects variable. The analysis revealed a main effect of word category, 
F(3,96) = 6.28, p< .05, with significantly longer digit-parity RTs for depression-relevant words 
relative to all other word categories (all p‟s <.05). Pairwise comparisons also revealed 
significantly longer digit-parity RTs for emotional adjective words than musical instrument 
words, p >.05, but no other significant differences between word categories (all p‟s >.05). Such 




involving diagnosis.  Consistent with our first prediction there was a word category x diagnosis 
interaction, F(3,96) = 7.55, p< .05.  
As can be seen in Figure 1A, for the non-depressed individuals word category had 
minimal influences on RTs.  By contrast, for the depressed individuals the depression relevant 
words delayed parity judgements relative to the other control conditions.  As can be seen by the 
confidence intervals around the means, when comparing the depressed and non-depressed 
individuals, the confidence intervals are overlapping in all the control conditions, but are non-
overlapping for the depression relevant words. 
 











Note. Error bars represent confidence intervals for each mean. 






































There was an unexpected rumination category x word category interaction, F(3,96) = 
2.86, p< .05. One notes however that the effect size of this interaction was much smaller than the 
predicted interaction between diagnosis and word category, and that this interaction did not 
emerge for the trimmed data analysis (described later).   
Consistent with our second hypothesis, the planned comparison between the rumination 
and non-rumination words within the depression relevant category was significant for the 
depressed individuals t(5)= 2.81, p<.05, with longer digit-parity RTs for rumination-relevant 
words relative to non-rumination relevant words. The same contrast was not significant for the 
non-depressed individuals t(27)= .485, p= 0.63. 
Response Times after Trimming 
 To ensure that the predicted effects noted above were not merely due to a few extreme 
RTs we reanalyzed the data using a conventional trimming strategy, excluding response times 
greater than 2500 ms.  We once again conducted a rumination category (rumination-relevant, 
non-rumination-relevant) by word category (depression-relevant, neutral, emotion-relevant, 
music) by diagnosis (depressed, non-depressed) analysis of variance. Mean digit-parity response 
times (ms) for each word category as a function of diagnosis are shown in Table 3. The analysis  
Table 3. Trimmed digit-parity mean response times (ms) for each word category as a function of diagnosis.  
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revealed a main effect of word category F(3, 93) = 3.536, p< .05, with significantly longer digit-
parity RTs for the depression-relevant words relative to the musical instrument words, p<.05. All 
other pairwise comparisons were non-significant, p‟s < .06. The analysis also revealed the 
predicted word category by diagnosis interaction F(3, 93) = 3.499, p< 05.  No other interactions 
or main effects were significant.  As can be seen by the graph in panel B of Figure 1, which 
shows the diagnosis by word category interaction, for the non-depressed individuals, word 
category had minimal influences on RTs, whereas for the depressed individuals the depression 
relevant words delayed parity judgements relative to the other control conditions.  As can be seen 
by the confidence intervals around the means, when comparing the depressed and non-depressed 
individuals, the confidence intervals are overlapping in all the control conditions, but are non-
overlapping for the depression relevant words. 







































 As predicted, the planned comparison between the rumination and non-rumination words 
within the depression relevant category was significant for the depressed individuals t(5)= 2.04, 
p<.05 one tailed.  The same contrast was not significant for the non-depressed individuals t(27) = 
.783, p= .22 one-tailed. 
 In summary, the analyses of the untrimmed and trimmed RTs both supported our a priori 
predictions:  only the depressed participants were preferentially influenced by depression 
relevant words, and among these depressed participants words that matched the specifics of what 
depressed participants ruminated about were more disruptive than words that were only generally 






 The present study examined the attention disrupting effects of depression-relevant words 
on digit-parity response times in clinically depressed and never-depressed individuals. Using a 
digit-parity task, participants were asked to make a speeded judgement about the parity of two 
digits flanking a to-be-ignored, centrally presented word. Word categories included depression-
relevant, neutral, musical instrument, and emotional adjective words. The results indicated that, 
as predicted, depressed individuals demonstrated significantly longer digit-parity response times 
on trials in which a depression-relevant word was presented between the digits relative to all 
other word categories. Furthermore, when the depression-relevant word group was parsed into 
rumination and non-rumination relevant word groups results indicated that, as predicted, 
depressed individuals demonstrated longer digit-parity response times on trials in which a 
rumination-relevant word was presented between the digits relative to non-rumination relevant 
words.  
 The present results support the findings of previous studies that have documented the 
operation of attentional biases in clinically depressed individuals (e.g., Gotlib & McCann, 1984; 
Gotlib & Cane, 1987; Gotlib et al., 2004; Siegle et al., 2003; Donaldson et al., 2007). However, 
as previously noted, the depression and attention literature has been plagued by inconsistent 
results. Many researchers have previously argued that attentional effects often depend on the 
match between presented stimuli and the emotional concerns of the population being examined 
(Mathews & McLeod, 1994; Mathew, Ridgeway, and Williamson, 1996). Indeed, inconsistent 
findings within the depression and attention literature can be attributed to a poor matching 
between the stimuli employed and the concerns of the depressed individuals being examined. 




the depression and attentional bias literature, results from the present investigation suggest that 
the answer resides, at least in part, within the ruminative content of the depressed individual. 
More specifically, results emphasize the need to consider individual differences in ruminative 
content and stress the importance of tailoring experimental designs to best reflect the 
idiosyncratic nature of depressive-rumination. 
 Previous attempts have been made to capture the idiosyncratic nature of depressive-
rumination. Siegle and colleagues (2003) asked depressed and never depressed participants to 
generate personally-relevant stimuli that best represented what they thought about when feeling 
depressed, to be used in the experimental task. Results indicated that depressed individuals 
displayed elevated and sustained pupil dilation responses to such stimuli on an emotional 
processing task.  Not only were these pupil dilation responses larger for depressed versus non-
depressed individuals doing the same task , but pupil dilation among the depressed individuals 
was particularly apparent in response to personally relevant information versus other negative, 
but not personally relevant information. Although these researchers took care to match the 
stimuli to the particular concerns of the individual, no attempts were made to control for lexical 
features of participant-generated word stimuli. Specifically, it is unknown whether sustained 
pupil dilation to personally relevant information is an artifact of greater attention allocation or a 
result of differing linguistic characteristics between word groups. After all, pupil dilation is 
induced by a myriad of cognitive operations (e.g., problem solving, task difficulty etc [see 
Andreassi, 2000])  To correct for this limitation, the present investigation employed an 
experimental design which not only was able to match on an individual level, the words used to 




also to ensure that the obtained effects were due to the semantic content of the words and not due 
to the linguistic features of these words such as word length, or frequency.  
Why does rumination content disrupt attention in cognitive tasks? One possibility is that 
content that has been recently processed preferentially disrupts attention in cognitive tasks 
relative to information that has not been recently processed. For example, Seigle, Germar, 
Truchon, Guirguis, and Horowitz (1995) found that the level of colour-naming interference 
shown by depressed patients increased when the colour carriers were negative words that had 
been processed immediately prior to carrying out the test trials. More specifically, depressed 
participants showed slower colour-naming latencies for self-descriptive negative words primed 
by self-descriptive negative phrases than when these same words were preceded by the 
processing of positive adjectives. It is possible that our findings as well as the confirmatory 
results of other dot-probe and Stroop experiments may arise because the negative material used 
as experimental stimuli has been primed due to prior processing of similar material during 
depressive rumination.  Given the frequency of rumination among depressed participants it is 
likely that certain words (i.e., the content of a given participants rumination) had been actively 
processed shortly before participating in the digit parity task.  This would explain why in the 
present study, depressed participants exhibited the longest digit-parity RTs when rumination-
relevant words appeared between the digits. This pattern of findings suggest that negative 
rumination-relevant information may be more salient within the cognitive systems of depressed 
individuals than information that is negative but not rumination-relevant.  
 Before considering the broader clinical implications of the current findings, a number of 
factors should be considered. The depressed participants in the present study were diagnosed on 




DSM-IV diagnostic criteria. Experimental rigour prompted us to seek a relatively “pure” sample 
of depressed participants free from any comorbid diagnoses. In addition, they were recruited 
from a sample of University undergraduates. Take together, it remains possible that our finding 
of a rumination-relevant attentional bias may not generalize to more severely depressed „real-
world‟ clinical samples which typically consist of high levels of comorbidity between symptoms 
of depression and most commonly symptoms of anxiety (Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998). 
Previously, it has been suggested that biases sometimes detected in depression are a function of 
elevated anxiety levels frequently seen in depressed individuals (Mineka, Rafaeli, & Yovel, 
2003). The choice of restricting our depressed participant population to only those individuals 
free of comorbid diagnoses while perhaps curtails the generalizability of our findings, 
nevertheless allows us to rule out an anxiety comorbidity explanation for our results.  
 It is possible that the addition of a psychopathological control group would have allowed 
for a stronger case to be made that interference for rumination-relevant words is specific to 
depression and not just a function of psychopathology in general. This drawback is somewhat 
off-set by our prediction for a differential pattern of interference within the depression group 
rather than between depressed versus non-depressed groups. That is, our most important finding 
was that within the depressed group ruminative content was more disruptive than depressive, 
but non-ruminative content.  
 This study was designed to rectify shortcomings in extant studies researching attentional 
biases and depression. In providing this link between rumination and attentional biases, the 
results suggest that rumination may be a vulnerability factor in depression. Rumination may 
render persons susceptible to depression in part because environmental stimuli relevant to the 




attentional processing. This prioritization of environmental triggers related to the content of their 
ruminative thoughts would serve to reinforce these ruminative thoughts and lead their depressed 
mood to become more severe over time. Eventually, that depressed mood may evolve into a 
major depressive episode. Furthermore, results suggest that the ruminative thoughts of depressed 
individuals may be a good place to start when attempting to intervene and prevent relapse. 
This study has a number of potentially important clinical implications. The observation 
that depressed individuals show attentional biases for stimuli that are congruent with the content 
of their self-reported depressive rumination suggests that treatment interventions should 
specifically focus on helping depressed individuals to disengage from ruminative processes. For 
that reason, the results from the present investigation have clear relevance for the use of 
mindfulness-based cognitive behavioural therapy (MBCT).  
Grounded in Teasdale‟s (1983) differential activation hypothesis and the interacting 
cognitive subsystems (ICS) framework, the theoretical background of MBCT argues that 
individuals who have experienced a depressive episode acquire strong associations between 
depressed mood and patterns of negative, self-devaluative, hopeless thinking (Teasdale, Segal, & 
Williams, 1995).  The resulting pattern of thinking leaves depressed individuals vulnerable to 
future depressive episodes because even a mild increase in sad mood can reactivate patterns of 
thinking reminiscent of past depressive episodes. Thus, these reactivated patterns of thinking can 
act to maintain and intensify the sad mood state through escalating and self-perpetuating cycles 
of ruminative cognitive-affective processing (Teasdale, 1988).  
The above account suggests that risk of relapse and depression recurrence will be reduced 
if depressed individuals can respond to future incidents of sad mood in ways that allow them to 




interrupt this ruminative cycle and teach depressed individuals to become more aware of their 
thoughts and feelings and respond to them in a “wider, decentered perspective as mental events 
rather than as aspects of the self or as necessarily accurate reflections of reality” (Teasdale, 
Segal, Williams, Ridgeway, Soulsby, Lau, 2000).  It is assumed that by cultivating a more 
detached view of thoughts MBCT will provide depressed individuals the skills necessary to 
prevent the escalation of negative thinking patterns at times of potential relapse. Preliminary 
evidence of the effectiveness of MBCT in the prevention of relapse in major depression show 
potential therapeutic promise. For example, Teasdale and colleagues (2000) found that for 
depressed patients with recurrent depression who had experienced three or more previous 
episodes, MBCT reduced relapse by almost 50% over the follow up period.  
In conclusion, these preliminary data indicate that contrary to what has long been 
assumed, attentional biases do operate in depression. Furthermore, these biases were shown to be 
related to rumination-relevant information. Future research that employs a similar methodology 
to the present study and uses formerly depressed participants will help to elucidate the nature of 
attentional biases in depression and advance our understanding of the possible role of rumination 
in maintaining these cognitive biases. 
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Appendix A – Word Lists 
 
Depression-





        
ALONE  TABLE  PIANO  SOUND  
ASHAMED  ANGULAR  TRUMPET  EARNEST  
AWFUL  FLEET  BUGLE  LOYAL  
BORING  BEACON  VIOLIN  POLITE  
DEPRESSED  DISCOURSE  ACCORDION  AGREEABLE  
EMPTY  CHAIR  FLUTE  QUICK  
FAILURE  DEVELOP  TIMPANI  OBVIOUS  
GUILTY  ALLIED  CORNET  ABSENT  
HELPLESS  HERITAGE  TRIANGLE  RATIONAL  
HOPELESS  ELIGIBLE  MANDOLIN  ANALYTIC  
HURT  CORE  OBOE  CALM  
ISOLATED  SEQUENCE  TROMBONE  ABSTRACT  
LONELY  WEEKLY  BONGOS  GENTLE  
LOST  READ  TUBA  LIVE  
PATHETIC  PHONEMIC  CLARINET  TOLERANT  
REPULSIVE  REDUNDANT  XYLOPHONE  ATTENTIVE  
STUPID  SUBTLE  GUITAR  CASUAL  
UGLY  URGE  HARP  NEAT  
UNHAPPY  UTTERLY  PICCOLO  ETHICAL  
UNPOPULAR  DUPLICATE  HARMONICA  COURTEOUS  
USELESS  CABINET  COWBELL  ORDERLY  
WEAK  FOLK  DRUM  CURT  
WORTHLESS  WATERSHED  SAXOPHONE  EXPECTANT  
RESENTFUL  REPAYMENT  CASTANETS  RIGHTEOUS  






Rumination-Relevant Rating Scale 
 
People think about many different things when they feel depressed. Please read each item below 
and indicate whether you never, sometimes, often, or always find yourself thinking about each 
one when you feel down, sad, or depressed. 
 
 
                                                                 1                           2                           3                           4 




When feeling sad I think about…. 
 
How much of a failure I am                     1                           2                           3                           4 
 
How hopeless I am                                   1                           2                           3                           4 
 
How unhappy I am                                  1                           2                           3                           4 
                               
How pathetic I am                                    1                           2                           3                           4 
 
How worthless I am                                 1                           2                           3                           4 
 
How repulsive I am                                  1                           2                           3                           4 
                                               
How stupid I am                                       1                           2                           3                           4 
 
How awful I am                                        1                           2                           3                           4 
 
How alone I am                                        1                           2                           3                           4 
                                      
How empty I am                                       1                           2                           3                           4 
                                                    
How useless I am                                      1                           2                           3                           4 
                                                 
How lost I am                                            1                           2                           3                           4 
   
How ashamed I am                                  1                           2                           3                           4 
 
How lonely I am                                       1                           2                           3                           4 
 





How weak I am                                         1                           2                           3                           4 
 
How guilty I am                                         1                           2                          3                           4 
 
How unpopular I am                                1                           2                           3                          4 
 
How boring I am                                       1                           2                           3                          4 
 
How depressed I am                                  1                           2                           3                          4 
 
How resentful I am                                   1                           2                           3                          4 
 
How helpless I am                                     1                            2                          3                          4 
 
How hurt I am                                           1                            2                          3                          4 
 
How confused I am                                   1                            2                          3                          4 
 
How isolated I am                                     1                            2                          3                          4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
